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Do Androids Dream  
of Electric Sheep?1 
 
Nicol Thomas 
I look at the world and I notices it’s turning 
while my guitar gently weeps 
With every mistake we must surely be learning 
still my guitar gently weeps 
George Harrison, While my guitar gently weeps 
 
This planet has […] a problem which [is] this: most of the people 
living on it [are] unhappy for pretty much of the time. Many solutions 
were suggested for this problem, but most of these [are] largely 
concerned with the movements of small green pieces of paper, which is 
odd because on the whole it [isn’t] the small green pieces of paper that 
[are] unhappy. 
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Part I — object wetware  
 
he who hears the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what 
takes Place. (Aristotle 335BCE Part XIV) 
 
Robert Pfaller encounters Lacan’s commentary on the Greek chorus. 
Something strikes him, something resonates. It raises a question for him; 
if the Chorus is a running commentary on the “feelings” of the actors 
playing the fiction (semblance) of a human reality for the passive 
audience watching, just who is “feeling” what, and where? For Pfaller this 
raises the thorny issue of “external existence”, the feeling that exists 
outside the body and lived experience of a human (divided) subject. He 
writes: 
 
Therefore, in a third step, a new example, with conceptual support 
from Lacanian theory, has to be introduced: Lacan’s idea that our 
most intimate feelings, beliefs and convictions can assume an 
“external existence”, and that the Chorus in Greek tragedy had 
precisely such a function […]: to feel fear and compassion 
vicariously, on behalf of the spectators. Yet, again, Lacan’s idea may 
appear as an audacious, highly speculative and arbitrary 
interpretation with little empirical support and even less plausibility. 
It is no wonder, then, that this passage in Lacan has for a long time 
passed unnoticed; nobody has made any use of it or referred to it, 
not even within Lacanian theory (Pfaller 2017: 71).2  
 
The passage that Pfaller is referring to is a quiet one, almost an aside, 
found in the Seminar of May 25 1960, and is subtitled “The splendor of 
Antigone” and can be found in Lacan’s seminal Seminar VII: The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis. It is a passage that is sandwiched – almost eclipsed –in 
a discussion of Antigone, her choice of death in her desire to give her 
brother’s dead body dignity, and the jouissance that stands outside of 
phallic jouissance and the Law. What does Lacan say about this Chorus, 
then? He states: 
 




When you go to the theatre […] Your emotions are taken charge of 
by the healthy order displayed on the stage. The Chorus takes care 
of them. The emotional commentary is done for you (Lacan 1960b: 
252).3 
 
And this, this emotional order and ordering by some thing outside 
the self, is what arrests Pfaller. How is it that there is something external 
to us that can be given the job of feeling for us? You don’t even have to 
feel your own feelings, you can delegate that messy job to some thing 
outside of yourself. 
 
What is this thing to which we delegate the task of feeling our 
feelings for us? Truly, what is it? 
 
Let us get this straight out on the table right from the start. There is a 
problem with delegating feelings to an object. For the simple, plain, 
logical reason that the object does not feel.  
 
In her article “Unbehagen: a gallantry with excess” (2017), Zeiher 
reminds us that Lacan raises an important question; why don’t planets 
speak? (Lacan 1955a, 1955b) “I put the question to an eminent 
philosopher,” Lacan says, “The question didn’t seem much to him to 
present any difficulties. He answered – Because they don’t have mouths” 
(Lacan 1955b: 237). Zeiher goes on to state: 
 
As Lacan quickly reminds us, that which does not have a mouth is 
not our radical alterity, rather “there is absolutely nothing about 
[inanimate objects] pertaining to an alterity with respect to 
themselves, they are purely and simply what they are.” At the same 
time and despite not having a mouth, Lacan contends that we 
demand planets speak a precise language distinguishable only to 
us. This is an essential reference point regarding the objects of 
technology. We trust in our conviction that the scientific method is 
impartial and independent and that science should therefore be free 
from investment in the social bond. Science must remain 




autonomous and operate independently within its own logic: this is 
science par excellence (Zeiher 2017: 2). 
 
We demand that planets speak, trusting that Science knows what its 
saying. 
 
Pfaller has a question for this Chorus: what are you? What is this 
Chorus-thing that looks like me – or not – and speaks the feelings that I 
am to hold in relation to the play being acted out in front of me? Do I feel 
those feelings myself? Am I being told what to feel? Am I responding to 
the semblance of life of the play (which I know to be a fiction) or are the 
ideas of how I am to respond being implanted into me by the Chorus, as 
though it is non-fiction? 
 
Or should I just sit back and let the Chorus and Actors do their thing 
whilst I nod off? 
 
It is a lot to think about when we could, just, be sitting back and 
watching this spectacle from a safe distance, safe in the knowledge that 
all of this “stuff” has little bearing on our own lives. With a logic that 
becomes absurdly twisted, this distancing from the “play” is in itself 
somewhat voyeuristic, somewhat perverse. 
 
It is a lot to think about, all the positions in this schema, and in his 
collection of essays Interpassivity: The Aesthetics of Delegated 
Enjoyment (2017), Pfaller examines several permutations of his question, 
arriving at a theorization that he terms “interpassivity”.  
 
Pfaller’s theorization of interpassive “enjoyment” evokes for me the 
question of the object(s) that Lacan speaks about, and the relation of the 
divided subject to all aspects of the object in question. Lacan even 
formulates mathemes to express this relation to the object: 
 
S ◊ a     AND    a ◊ S 4 
 




But already what the object is becomes confusing, for in these two 
expressions of relation to the object, each object is not the same as the 
other. The matheme S ◊ a is the matheme of neurotic fantasy, from 
which desire follows because the fundamental object of desire is lost, 
never to be recouped in the Real. The matheme a ◊ S  describes the 
perverse fantasy, in which the object is disturbingly concrete and acts in 
all manners upon the divided subject in the precise opposition of loss, 
that of the thing that is Real; unrepresentable and the cause of anxiety. 
 
I will flag right here that this is relevant to Pfaller’s question: what is 
the object. For us in the audience, what is the Chorus, then? Is the 
Chorus wise and interpretative, giving us clues to what we “should” be 
feeling according the wise author, the Master, who wrote the play and 
who “knows” about these things (and from whom we are one or two 
steps removed)? The actors, who portray to us the ethics as pertaining to 
Antigone, as though our shadows are projected against a cave wall? Do 
we aspire to believe the Chorus, who functions to organize what our 
feelings should be? In other words, as Pfaller asks, “Can public opinion 
convince me that I am having fun?” (Pfaller 2017: 35). 
 
Or, are we fascinated by the Chorus who insists this is what’s what, 
but repelled at the same time because they are forcing something on us 
– correct feelings, right thinking –that we think are ethical but at the same 
time NQR, leaving us a little queasy, uncomfortable, unconvinced.  
 
Already, we the audience, we are too involved and in this little 
schema, certainly not impassively. We are watching with passion and 
involvement, and the Chorus, the object – whether lost or concrete  – 
engages us; we are close to, (space) engaged with, the Chorus. This is a 
reading according to the divided subject engaging with the aesthetics of 
Antigone, which in my understanding is also the primal foundation of 
drama, perhaps even a prime directive of civilization; that that which 
needs to be subject to the benign Law is acted out for us and the 
corresponding emotions of the audience serve to enact a catharsis and 
sublimation of all those awful and deadly drives that lead us to murder 
each other. A “cleansing” of deadly passions. Happy ending much?5 





 There are several examples which stand out for Pfaller, and which 
I think contribute very well to this discussion of the nature of the object. 
Pfaller’s observation on the Greek Chorus leads him to question what 
happens to pleasure, or “fun”, or even jouissance; in Lacan’s commentary 
on the Chorus, Lacan notices that the audience leave the “pleasure of the 
catharsis” to the Chorus: 
 
The Chorus takes care of them. The emotional commentary is done 
for you. The greatest chance for the survival of classical tragedy 
depends on that. The emotional commentary is done for you. It is 
just sufficiently silly; it is also not without firmness; it is more or less 
human. 
 
Therefore, you don’t have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, 
the Chorus will feel in your stead. Why after all can one not imagine 
that the effect on you may be achieved, at least a small dose of it, 
even if you didn’t tremble that much? To be honest, I’m not sure if 
the spectator ever trembles that much. I am, however, sure that he 
is fascinated by the image of Antigone (Lacan 1960b: 252). 
 
Catharsis however, as Freud points out, serves a function. In his 
early work with Breuer, Freud notices that “an injury that has been 
suffered in silence [is] ‘a mortification’ […] The injured person’s reaction to 
the trauma only exercises a completely ‘cathartic’ effect is it is an 
adequate reaction – as, for instance, revenge. But language serves as a 
substitute for action; by its help, an affect can be ‘abreacted’ […] when, for 
instance, it is a lamentation of giving utterance to a tormented secret, eg, 
a confession” (Freud 1893: 8).  
 
Aristotle’s Chorus serves this purpose for the play, but also for the 
audience. The Chorus speaks something, the affect, thus allegedly 
abreacting any unLawful or disorderly drives that the divided subjects of 
the audience may hold. What strikes Pfaller in Lacan’s depiction of the 
Chorus has to be taken in context of the hic et nunc. Much like spectators 




of football or ice-hockey today, Aristotle’s audiences could get something 
off their chests whilst watching a tragedy, rather than killing each other. 
 
 The object of tragedy, and the catharsis that tragedy is meant to 
bring about, (comma) holds a shifty position. Aristotle already noticed the 
“lost” quality of the object, and the notion that proper tragedy imitates the 
object: 
 
Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to 
contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity: such as the 
forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of 
this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to 
philosophers but to men in general; whose capacity, however, of 
learning is more limited. Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a 
likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or 
inferring, and saying perhaps, “Ah, that is he.” For if you happen not 
to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the 
imitation as such, but to the execution, the coloring, or some such 
other cause (Aristotle 335BCE Part IV).   
 
The divided subject who views the tragedy takes pleasure in the 
spectacle, the way “it looks”, the way the spectacle senses a traumatic 
part within  – a personal affect  – and speaks this trauma for the viewer 
(or at least, in Aristotle’s schema of things). 
 
But there are many different ways this spectacle-object can operate, 
and Aristotle’s “proper use” of tragedy speaks to a specific type of object 
relation, that is referring to what Lacan calls object a, that lost thing that 
we are forever searching for and is the object cause of desire, never to 
be refound.6 It is an object proper to a certain type of neurosis described 
by Lacan, and is the object that forms the matheme of the fantasy of 
desire, S ◊ a. Aristotle himself says: 
 
Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, 
and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind 
of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts 




of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and 
fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions (Aristotle 
335BCE Part VI). 
 
To mourn the lost object is the catharsis; and thus, to give voice to our 
tragedy of primal loss there needs to be an object towards which to aim 
the effect of affect. Lacan positions this object as the analyst,7 but for 
Aristotle, the play’s the thing – more of a group therapy in the hic et nunc 
when the civilizing laws of the group were still in process of being 
formalized.  
 
But for Lacan – and this is what sparks Pfaller’s question – 
something else has happened in the meantime. It is at this point the hic 
et nunc of contemporary times is, I believe, what has changed and 
probably the object along with the times.  
Pfaller tells us that interpassivity is this: guided by his revelation on 
Lacan’s observation of the Greek chorus, Pfaller notices that the 
audience delegates its catharsis onto the Chorus (whom Aristotle notes 
should too be regarded as actors8). I suggest Aristotle would argue that – 
as I would – in that his intention of catharsis was not a delegation but a 
discourse into which the audience was included. But that is a matter for 
the ancient Greek hic et nunc. “In my view,” states Lacan, “the Chorus is 
people who are moved” (Lacan 1960b: 252). This implies – according to 
the notion of dramatic catharsis – that the audience is involved as the 
Chorus themselves.  
 
For Pfaller’s reading of Lacan changes this: Pfaller picks up that 
Lacan’s audience has abnegated their position in the discourse of 
tragedy/drama and simply goes to the theatre, passively: 
 
Therefore, look closely before telling yourself that emotions are 
engaged in this purification. They are engaged, along with others, 
when at the end they have to be pacified by some artifice or other. 
But that doesn’t mean to say that they are directly engaged. On the 
one hand, they no doubt are, and you are there in the form of a 
material to be made use of; on the other hand, that material is also 




completely indifferent. When you go to the theatre in the evening, 
you are preoccupied by the affairs of the day, by the pen that you 
lost, by the check that you will have to sign the next day. You 
shouldn’t give yourselves too much credit. Your emotions are taken 
charge of by the healthy order displayed on the stage. The Chorus 
takes care of them. The emotional commentary is done for you […] 
 
 Therefore, you don’t have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, 
the Chorus will feel in your stead. Why after all can one not imagine 
that the effect on you may be achieved, at least a small dose of it, 
even if you didn’t tremble that much? […] 
 
In this he is the spectator, but the question we need to ask is, What 
is he a spectator of? What is the image represented by Antigone? 
That is the question (Lacan 1960b: 252). 
 
There is no longer any discourse between audience and tragedy 
(which is mediated via the actors), there is no movement or catharsis, 
and we are left with a passively stuffed audience who is watching what? 
Pfaller has – quite correctly – observed something; something has 
happened to the discourse between audience member and actor. The 
action of catharsis has changed. The audience member has become too 
busy or distracted to engage in the work of catharsis and has given the 
job to the Chorus. But the Chorus has changed quality too. Passivity 
begins an insidious creep: the audience member is too passive to 
engage in catharsis and so delegates this job to an other, the Chorus. But 
what of the Chorus?  
  
Pfaller links Lacan’s statement that the Chorus feels for us to 
enjoyment. Something – some thing – outside of ourselves does the work 
of enjoyment for us so that we don’t have to. It is an odd phenomenon, 
and Pfaller asks “What is the benefit that interpassive people derive from 
letting the means of their pleasure be consumed by others? What is the 
gain, the specific satisfaction in delegating one’s pleasure? How is it 
possible to enjoy through the other?” (Pfaller 2017: 33). The Chorus, we 
see, whilst no longer including us, is still made of divided subjects who 




are acting (as we all do, all the time). There is still a link, a common 
identification – All the world’s a stage, after all, and all the men and 
women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances, and one 
man in his time plays many parts9 – that we still must respect. 
 
Pfaller evokes Freud to speak to this identification with an other:  
Like “identification”, the notion of “displaced narcissism” also 
appears to miss the point. It is true, as Freud has noted, that it is 
possible to displace one’s narcissism — which means that one can 
give one’s narcissism to somebody else […] displacing one’s 
narcissism to the other means making the other an object of love 
[…] But that is also not the case [for the interpassive subject] […] The 
other is quite indifferent here. It can be anybody, even a stranger. 
What matters here is that a certain job gets done, by no matter 
whom. It should just be done by somebody other than itself. The job 
to be done is yet a specific one: it is not a job of work, but of 
enjoyment. You wish the other to do in your place what you yourself 
want to do (Pfaller 2017: 50). 
 
So Lacan’s audience wants the Chorus to enjoy the tragedy of 
Antigone for them, because they are elsewhere. This is, for Pfaller, the 
first step in his theory of interpassivity. 
 
If we wish to linger with Lacan, we can speculate that here there is a 
fundamental shift in the relation to the object, and as I have stated 
previously, it becomes imperative to question the object itself. Because, 
as I have said, it is not the object — technically — that does the feeling 
for us, but our own position in the face of that very object. 
 
There are objects and there are objects. 
 
Part II — neither fish nor fowl nor good red herring 
 
Psychoanalysis works with three fundamental psychic structures: 
neurosis, psychosis and perversion. Within neurosis, there are two further 
distinctions, hysteria and obsessional neurosis. All of the structures stand 




in position to the object, differently. All of these structures do something 
different with differing objects. I have already begun to speak about 
Lacan’s mathemes of fantasy, stating that the first matheme, S ◊ a, is 
more to do with the neurotic’s relationship to a primal lost object that is 
long gone, but the search for which shapes desire (whether this is a 
desire on the side of jouissance or a well-informed desire is another 
matter). The second matheme I introduced is that of the perverse fantasy: 
a ◊ S. We can see this as a simple reversal of the first matheme, and 
indeed there is a relationship between neurotic desire and the perverse 
trait. But in perversion proper, the perverse subject – who cannot bear his 
own division10 which makes him extremely anxious – utilizes an object to 
plug his division. 
 
Whereas for neurotics the primal object is lost, and the enjoyment 
comes from the search for this very lost object, for the pervert the object 
is never apprehended as lost. The pervert – for whom loss is unbearable 
– creates an object to fill the gap of loss, thus preventing any access to a 
well-shaped desire. The pervert makes a fetish object, an object in the 
Real. The pervert utilizes this fetish for a twisted “ethical” purpose; 
because the fetish is the answer to all loss – goes the logic – the pervert 
must needs share his answer with a partner (or partners) to solve the 
agony of their loss. Never mind that neurotics and psychotics hold 
different positions to their objects.  
 
Pfaller gives us a beautiful example of this in demonstrating the way 
a subject may delegate their own enjoyment on to an other: 
 
Luckily, there is a name for this structure: interpassivity. 
Interpassivity is the case when somebody prefers to delegate 
their enjoyment (their passivity) to some other instead of enjoying 
themselves. So what Freud tries to designate by the term “displaced 
narcissism” can be more adequately rendered as delegated 
enjoyment. To give an example, I once encountered a man who 
was a big drinker. All of a sudden he changed, and did not drink 
anymore. But he adopted a new passion: he became a perfect host. 
He would always have a bottle in his hand and take care that 




glasses of his guests were refilled, so that he could, as it were, 
continue to be a drinker through his guests. He had become an 
interpassive drinker (Pfaller 2017: 50). 
 
This actually struck me as problematic on first reading. Yes, the man 
of this vignette certainly was doing something to his guests, but what?  
 
To answer this first, we must contemplate the difference between 
jouissance and a well-formed desire; which begs the question, what is 
enjoyment? 
 
The term that Lacan utilizes throughout his work associated with the 
thorny issue of pleasure is jouissance. It is a word based in the French 
verb “jouir” (to enjoy) and “jouissance” (pleasure).11 Lacan reformulates 
Freud’s notion of the beyond of pleasure via jouissance. Whilst the 
pleasure principle introduces a limit to pleasure – and thus castration – 
jouissance goes beyond this limitation into unpleasure and suffering. It is 
a terrain to which the unconscious returns, as it contains traces of 
infantile trauma, but also is attached to the polymorphous perverse state 
which language and the Law places a limit on to. The drives attempt to 
break through the pleasure principle in search of jouissance. Lacan also 
distinguishes between phallic jouissance and feminine jouissance, which 
are two different iterations of jouissance. 
 
To displace enjoyment such as this host does, to constantly fill his 
guest’s glasses so as to render them with his enjoyment reads to me 
much more on the side of jouissance. If this host is a drinker through his 
guests, he is getting off – as it were – on their drinking; he is giving them 
his former jouissance, which for some reason that we do not know, has 
become somehow unbearable to him. This anxiety he manages by 
giving it others, in the double-speak of disavowal; “I don’t have it (the 
alcohol) but I do so that I can give it to others, see how they enjoy it”. His 
passion is to see others enjoying, to see their jouissance; to watch the 
spectacle of his guests becoming drunk. His perverse “ethics” sees that 
he experiences some sort of loss — giving up drinking — only to fill his 
guest’s glasses with his own loss. Alcohol becomes a fetish object. It is 




not lost at all, it is there in the bottle from which he pours his own 
jouissance into the glasses of his guests. We do not know what his 
guests think or feel, if they enjoy getting plastered, or want to give up, or 
don’t even like alcohol at all. This pervert gives his jouissance to his 
partners and enjoys that without the limit of the partner’s consent (or 
castration, which is exactly what this pervert cannot bear). 
 
With this example, I wondered if Pfaller meant that interpassivity 
was a form of enjoyment in the manner of the perverse structure? 
Perhaps, though, we can see this as Pfaller’s first step on the theory of 
interpassivity, because as with the example of the Chorus, there is still an 
identification occurring here; there is still an other divided subject in the 
mix, whether it be the other we love via displaced narcissism, or the 
partner that the pervert seduces into the perverse relationship, in which 
the pervert who has the fetish gives it to a partner whose own 
relationship to the fetish is questionable.12 
 
But Pfaller doesn’t let us off so lightly. He questions the notion of as 
if, and its relationship to its object: 
 
Delegation takes place here by acting as if. By the help of 
some other agent we create an appearance: we stage a small 
representation of our enjoyment, and this allows a small 
representation of our enjoyment, and this allows us to stay away 
from it. So, in interpassivity, we establish a symbolic representation 
of our enjoyment instead of really enjoying it. We replace an act by 
something acting as if (Pfaller 2017: 50). 
 
The pervert is not acting as if in Pfaller’s vignette of the host who 
gets off on his guest’s drinking. The pervert is very much enjoying his 
guests’s jouissance. Their pleasure (or the beyond of their pleasure) is 
his. There is nothing as if about this. The relationship that I believe Pfaller 
is reaching for in the as if notion has more to do with the psychotic 
structure than the perverse. Psychosis operates via the action of 
foreclosure; that is, castration – the “no” that forbids polymorphous 
perverse pleasure and ensures that the Law of civilization is instilled – is 




radically refused, never put into place for the subject. Law is refused, 
especially the Law that Greek drama speaks about; the type of 
benevolent law that prevents people from staying in the lawless state 
that existed when God spoke to Noah.13 
 
Psychosis is on a level that is difficult to comprehend for a neurotic 
subject; there is no relation to the Law, castration or Symbolic register, 
the register in which the group is inscribed. The Law and the Symbolic 
register is that to which the neurotic and the pervert hold a position; for 
the neurotic and the pervert, the Symbolic register of the Law is what to 
kick against, or not. For the psychotic, this is forever foreclosed, there is 
no entry, no engagement with Symbolic register. The relation to 
unconscious repression simply is not there, the unconscious may be 
somewhere but it is not functioning. Lacan says: 
 
What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression 
and the return of the repressed are just the two sides of the same 
coin. The repressed is always there, expressed in a perfectly 
articulate manner in symptoms and a host of other phenomena. By 
contrast, what falls under the effect of Verwerfung [foreclosure] has 
a completely different destiny […] It’s not pointless in this respect for 
me to remind you of the comparison I made […] between certain 
symbolic order phenomena and what happens in those machines, 
in the modern sense of the word, that do not quite talk […] we can 
only introduce things into the circuit if we respect the machine’s 
own rhythm — otherwise they won’t go in and can’t enter the circuit. 
We can re-use the same image. Only it also happens that whatever 
is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung 
[foreclosure], reappears in the real (Lacan 1955c: 12-13). 
 
This is precisely where the psychotic object appears, in the register 
of the Real. But it is also, precisely, not the concrete fetish object either, 
which also appears in reality, with its purpose is to create a currency of 
jouissance that circulates between two subjects. The fetish – if we use 
perverse “ethics” – serves a purpose in the moral imperative of the will to 
jouissance14. The psychotic object is something else. What is refused in 




the Symbolic register for the psychotic returns as a real thing, a concrete 
representation of where the unconscious object is in neurosis. The 
phenomenon of paranoia bears witness to this. It is not a lost object that 
the subject tries to refind, it is not a fetish object of such ambivalence that 
one is both fascinated and repulsed by and has to do with a partner and 
enjoyment. The psychotic object is fearsome and persecutory and is 
very, very real, it cannot be symbolized via another signifier, or 
disavowed. The psychotic fears it. Someone who is not psychotic may 
hear this object as a delusion, and a psychotic solution to this difficult 
universe he has to inhabit is to create an “orthopedic structure”, a 
scaffolding based on strategies “as if”. This scaffolding provides a 
guideline on living for the psychotic so that he can live “as if” he is living 
on the Symbolic register of the Law, and his very existence depends on 
this to move through the world. 
 
It is a tragic circumstance. 
 
When Pfaller speaks of delegating enjoyment as if, by replacing an 
act with an act as if, I begin to wonder if he is now speaking of the 
psychotic object, which is delusional and persecutory to the subject in 
question. Certainly, for the hallucinating schizophrenic subject, or the 
persecuted paranoid subject, the experience with the delusion is 
anything but passive. A “symbolic representation”, it seems to me, has 
nothing to do with the psychotic object. We generally do not go to the 
theatre and come away certain that the Chorus is going to kill us and 
dismember us, or that we are the dead body of Antigone’s brother, which 
would be a very difficult thing. 
 
Part III — from object to i-thing15 
 
So again, I ask: what is the object of interpassivity? 
 
I take Pfaller’s positioning of the “as if” as step two in tracing out the 
theory of interpassivity. The psychotic object has a purpose here, if only 
to establish that the object Pfaller begins to describe more and more is 
precisely not an object that has a relation to a divided subject; it is not a 




human mistaken for something else long forgotten, nor is it an object that 
serves to cause jouissance in another human for the first human’s 
pleasure. It is not a psychotic object, for Pfaller does not ascribe a fear 
attached to this object that would cause a weltanschauung, a horrifying 
subjective collapse to the point of creating a delusional replacement 
world. 
 
The object of interpassivity is supposed to experience pleasure for 
the interpassive subject; or is it meant to represent the experience of 
pleasure for the interpassive subject? These are two different actions. 
What is pleasure now delegated to in Pfaller’s theory? The interpassive 
person delegates pleasure to some-thing else instead of enjoying for 
himself. The interpassive person puts a distance between the self and 
pleasure and it is the thing, the object that is supposed to enjoy. 
 
We see this odd dance of distance and pleasure in obsessional 
neurosis. Freud describes very well the rituals that an obsessional will 
engage in to stop pleasure; masturbatory or otherwise.16 It is the ritual that 
is designed to put a space between the subject and his pleasure, a 
defence against pleasure as it were. It is somewhat similar to a 
perversion, in that desire and pleasure cause the obsessional subject 
anxiety. But instead of the solution of the fetish, the obsessional distances 
himself from all engagement with the question whatsoever. Pfaller gives 
us a neat example of the intellectual and the strange love-affair with the 
photocopier: 
 
One may be familiar with the interpassive behaviour of some 
intellectuals in libraries: these intellectuals find an interesting book, 
rush to the photocopier, copy some hundred pages, and then give 
the book back and go home with a deep sense of satisfaction — as 
if the machine had already read the text in their place. The crucial 
point in this case of interpassive behaviour is the figurativeness of 
the act: what the intellectuals do (usually without knowing it) is to 
act as if the photocopier were reading the text. They literally play 
reading by means of the machine: the light of attention, as it were, is 




shed on every page, one after another, in a linear process; slowly 
the machine “looks” at every line and every page. 
 
Figurativeness, and the substitution of a real act (such as 
reading) by a figurative representation of it (such as photocopying) 
is characteristic of ritual action. Interpassivity consists in ritual acts. 
This ritual character of interpassive practices provides us with an 
answer concerning the method of interpassivity: the interpassive 
person and her medium are not connected by tubes, but by a 
representation. The interpassive person delegates her pleasure to a 
medium by ritually causing this medium to perform a figurative 
representation of consumption. The one who ritually causes this act 
is the one for whom the medium reads, observes, laughs, eats, and 
so on (Pfaller 2017: 56-57). 
 
My reading of this is a repetitive question: what exactly is this object 
that we invest our pleasure in? For Pfaller, it increasingly becomes a 
machine, and not another subject onto which we project our 
“representations”. And this is not without context in our hic et nunc in 
which machines and technology have become pervasive. This, perhaps, 
we can see as Step Three in Pfaller’s theory. He gives us a few more 
examples. 
 
Of course, Pfaller brings us a fetish, Marx’s commodity fetish that he 
reads via Žižek, we have become the objects of our objects, as though 
the object is the Master in the Real. We become slaves to economic units 
and exist in their service (which is Marx’s criticism of capitalism). But, as 
Douglas Adams points out, it’s not the money that is happy (Adams 1979: 
6). It occurs to me that the communist/socialist fixation with capital falls 
on the side of the psychotic object; unable to be placed in a Law of 
desire, and completely persecutory in the Real.  
 
Žižek’s analysis brings in the Tibetan prayer wheel, which adds a 
benign element to Marx’s formulation: the prayer wheel is the thing that is 
able to believe instead of us and for us, a reification of the priest, a 
concrete object that believes for us instead of a flesh and blood man.17 




But we also have the example of canned laughter, which Pfaller links to 
the Chorus; the canned laughter not only indicates to the viewer of the 
television when to laugh, when to make catharsis, but also that there is 
the semblant – albeit a machine – that can laugh instead of us and we 
can passively view. So can we say that the passivity of the viewer (who 
does not laugh, does not engage in catharsis) relies upon the machine to 
do this job, but the machine itself is simply that, a machine and is passive 
in its orientation in the same manner as the planet who does not speak? 
What is this interpassive object? A void? 
 
We have to bear in mind the relationship of this phenomenon of the 
“interpassive person” and obsessional neurosis, the defence against 
pleasure. Pfaller asks: “What is the benefit that interpassive people derive 
from letting the means of their pleasure be consumed by the other? 
What is the gain, the specific satisfaction in delegating one’s pleasure? 
How is possible to enjoy through the other?” (Pfaller 2017: 33) and “Can 
an absence of pleasure sometimes be identical with the pleasure of 
absence?” (Pfaller 2017: 34).18 
 
I wonder, though, if by “interpassive person” Pfaller means the 
obsessional neurotic who puts a distance between himself and desire, 
because having to encounter desire (and possibly pleasure) means 
having to make a choice about desire. Or is the “interpassive person” the 
one who gets off on pouring wine to the guest whose pleasure he is 
watching, with his own particular type of pleasure? Or is the “interpassive 
person” the one who acts “as if” the pleasure that is rejected by psychotic 
foreclosure is enacted by a representation which is apprehended as 
horrifyingly real and about to destroy him? In paranoia, the object really 
acts “as if” it is the one who is experiencing the jouissance that is 
unbearable for the subject. 
 
But, more disturbing, is Pfaller’s question of pleasure being 
consumed by the other; what other, specifically, are we talking about? 
Pfaller has already indicated the other he believes is involved with in the 
interpassive action, is a machine. We have seen via the structures of 




psychoanalysis that all subjects of a structure (which is all of us) have a 
particular relation to the object, of which there are many types.  
 
The object itself, whether Real, delusional, lost or fetishistic does not 
enjoy the pleasure we transfer on to it. The photocopier doesn’t care if 
you desire it to read in the same way as the planets don’t speak.  
 
Part IV — the excess is us 
 
We transfer our jouissance on to an external object. The object per se 
doesn’t matter, it cannot speak, it is as deaf as a planet. If the object onto 
which we transfer our own hopes and dreams happens to be another 
human, their divided humanity takes us by surprise when it asserts itself 
and objects to your supposition of it as object. But when we fall passive 
and delegate (rather than transfer) our jouissance on to a machine that 
cannot speak and does not have an unconscious – rendering it more 
than merely passive, it is inert – we have a problem. Passivity does not 
speak to passivity, it is a nothingness that swallows up any chance of 
creation ex nihilo.19  
 
It is a problem knowing what to do with surplus jouissance to begin 
with. Our relationship to that little bit extra of ourselves is what drives us 
to the analyst, to the subject-supposed-to-know what to do with it. We 
know that for Marx, that surplus, that little bit “extra” which caused him so 
much anxiety, was capital; the object. 
 
What Pfaller has observed is that there is always some thing that 
causes anxiety, even if it began with pleasure, which then turned deadly. 
Pfaller observes the very action of jouissance.  
What Pfaller observes, also, is how this anxiety is managed by a 
particular “type” of person, who in analytic terms falls under one of the 
three psychic structures. This “handling” of anxiety-to-do-with-pleasure is 
what strikes him as interpassive; how come the “interpassive” person 
delegates his pleasure elsewhere? But as I read Pfaller, his theory of 
interpassivity can be addressed to several different psychic structures in 
his vignettes and examples. Most strikingly, Pfaller’s theory of interpassivity 




gives us something that looks like obsessional neurosis: a distancing of 
affect to ward off anxiety and even desire. The notion that an other enjoys 
for us, an object outside of ourselves. 
 
However, for most obsessional neurotics, this very object is the objet 
a, that lost object that causes desire, causes us to want because we know 
we don’t have. This wanting is what inspires and provokes us to go out 
and seek something — albeit when we think we find “it”, it’s never good 
enough. The obsessional neurotic is the one who can never go after what 
he wants because there is always something in the way: the obsessional 
neurotic goes through great and intricate lengths to throw up blocks in his 
path to interrogating his desire. Pfaller’s interpassive individual, much like 
the pervert, as we have seen, utilizes the object to displace jouissance on 
to an other. (Although let us not forget that the neurotic has a relationship 
to perversion: the neurotic dreams of polymorphous perversion without 
limit, but this remains in the realm of neurotic fantasy — untangling 
perverse fantasy from desire is a large mental work for the neurotic. The 
pervert, on the other hand, acts out the perversion on an other in the real, 
which is why there is a primacy for the pervert to have a partner who can 
embody jouissance in the real. The pervert’s partner is complicit in this 
currency of jouissance. This is the opposite of desire, because it involves 
concrete objects, acts and flesh.) 
 
Marx’s excess, the surplus, is problematic, and Pfaller picks up on this 
in his evocation of the Tibetan prayer wheels and canned laughter. This 
type of object is a universe away from his question of the Chorus. The 
interpassive individual who allows the Chorus to tidy up his feelings – as 
Lacan describes – falls more on the side of the neurotic, and the neurotic’s 
relationship to lack and desire, and his machinations around the lost 
object. 
 
Marx’s excess is positioned as Real. This surplus capital is 
persecutory for Marx, and he goes to great lengths to establish a world of 
his own to try and cope with it. He attempts to make a world that runs 
without division, without divided subjects: the division of labour is meant 
to eradicate difference and level all humans – albeit human capital cogs 




in the service of an implacable, utopian state – to one plane; socialist 
utopia. Much like Schreber’s delusional world,20 the socialist utopia cannot 
bear difference, in particular not the difference of the divided subject and 
the prevalence of the unconscious. 
 
The real object has a relation to Kant’s notion of Sovereign Good 
(Lacan 1963c). The pervert uses the object – the fetish – to claim that 
jouissance for the benefit of all man; the fetish plugs up all anxiety, and he, 
the pervert, holds the key to cure all ills for the other. Bear in mind here, 
that the fetish still acts upon the other; the will to jouissance is what 
troubles and fascinates the neurotic subject at the same time. 
 
The Marxist thing, though, also lays claim to a Sovereign Good, but in 
a way that is different to the pervert’s fetish: eradicate that excess and we 
can build utopia. It operates in a manner very, very different to the fetish, 
that Marx attempted to link to commodity, but in the end only created a 
persecutory thing.21  
 
The Marxist thing is Real and persecutory. As Lacan tells us: 
 
Jouissance is very precisely correlated with the initial form of 
the entry into play of what I am calling the mark, the unary trait, 
which is a mark toward death, if you want to give it its meaning. 
Observe that nothing takes on any meaning except when death 
comes into play. 
 
 It is on the basis of this split, the separation, between 
jouissance and the henceforth mortified body, it is form the moment 
that there is a play of inscriptions, a mark of the unary trait, that the 
question arises. There is no need to wait until the subject has shown 
itself to have been well hidden, at the level of the master’s truth. The 
subject’s division is without doubt nothing other than the radical 








Let us talk about this […] that is not based on exchange — in 
conclusion 
 
Interpassivity as Pfaller describes it has a curious relationship to 
exchange. I have observed — casually, perhaps — that it is completely 
impossible for the divided subject calling himself a human to operate 
without exchange. The neurotic, the pervert and the psychotic all want 
something in return for what they give (in accordance with their 
structure). The hysteric demands to be loved and desired in equal or 
greater part in return for the gift of her love. The pervert wants the 
jouissance of the other in return for his gift of  “ethics”. The psychotic 
wants to be held in a logical stability – however delusional – to stop the 
utter destruction of the universe by division. The obsessional wants the 
sex and pleasure he’s been told he can’t have, but is unwilling to pay for it 
with a little bit of necessary castration: he distances himself from this 
exchange, but that is not to say that his secret is that he really, really 
wants it. 
 
For Pfaller, the “interpassive” person delegates pleasure to a thing, 
which is apparently designed to enjoy for him, and I have argued already 
that this is a strong trait of obsessional neurosis. But the object is different 
in Pfaller’s version of obsessional neurosis: the object is mechanical. The 
“passivity” of “interpassivity” is just quite that: no-one has to give anything 
to anyone; there is no exchange whatsoever. In fact, assigning 
enjoyment to canned laughter becomes to be more in the realm of a 
pervert’s disavowal: I know the laughter is canned, but then again 
someone is enjoying it. Not me, though, I don’t have to work that hard. 
 
Let us return to these objects that are supposed to do the work of 
pleasure for us, the photocopier, the prayer wheel and the television’s 
canned laughter. I would like to contend that thinking the thing has gone 
a little too far, and in the hic et nunc, we have this new version of a thing, 
the i-thing. It permeates every part of our functioning lives these days, 
and indeed, we cannot really even do business without it. It is inevitable, 
and whatever way our individual structure identifies with it, it is there.22 It 




is a tool that we utilize in accordance with our structure for whatever we 
need it to be. 
 
But I am still troubled by the question of the object of interpassivity, 
since Pfaller’s depiction of how interpassive subjects displace their 
pleasure onto the thing is confused by structural differences. It is 
problematic that there is still the concept that the thing – somehow – 
believes, enjoys, or otherwise contains its own jouissance, the one the 
interpassive (obsessional? psychotic? perverse?) subject cannot bear 
this.23 
 
I wrote earlier on about Zeiher’s comment on science, and the idea 
that we trust science as a fully autonomous agent that operates above 
and beyond our human capacity as a full Master. I would like to return to 
this idea in relation to the object of interpassivity, because there is 
something in Pfaller’s theory that is elusive, still. For each subject, the 
thing stands in for something, whether it is lost, is real, is entitled with an 
“ethics” of jouissance or is persecutory. But what is the object of 
interpassivity? Unlike das Ding, there is no central point of erotics 
involved, even to a remote object that is rendered without subjectivity 
(Lacan 1960a: 146). The erotics that is attached to das Ding is delegated 
to the point of erasure in the theory of interpassivity. 
 
Is it the object that holds the place we designate to the Master of 
Science, which knows us better than we know ourselves? For we laud 
science and the scientific object better than our degraded, divided being. 
We look to “artificial intelligence” to free us from our misery. We want this 
mechanical “overlord” to tell us what to do, the Master who manages our 
jouissance for us. According to Pfaller’s theory of interpassivity, we 
willingly give over our jouissance to this thing to manage for us, fully 
trusting – in an almost foreclosed manner – that we don’t have to do the 
work anymore.  
 
But there is a catch to this, and this catch needs to be pointed out 
before we go any deeper into our interpassivity. I must return to my 
original question: what is the object in interpassivity?  





Like the planets, the i-thing does not speak. We give it the words, the 
words come from us. We program the machine with our words, our 
capacity for language. But that is not to say, then, that the machine 
knows what it is saying. The machine does not have an unconscious. 
 
Lacan tells us this: 
 
Of course there are things that run and that certainly seem to work 
like little machines — they are called computers. I am willing to 
accept the notion that a computer thinks. But that it knows, who 
would say such a thing? For the foundation of knowledge is that the 
jouissance of its exercise is the same as that of its acquisition 
(Lacan 1973b: 97). 
 
The machine thinks; of course it does, it thinks with the language of 
the programmer. But apart from that? It can never know, with the 
unconscious knowledge that the divided subject contains within 
themselves, just as the spun prayer wheel will never know the anguish 
contained in the supplicant’s prayer. How can this metal wheel then 
speak to God? Not even as if. 
 
How can the canned laughter know exactly which part of the joke 
the viewer may find funny? 
 
But the most frightening question of all that I have to ask of 
interpassivity is why are we divided subjects so passive that we allow 
these machines to tell us what, where, when and how we are feeling? 
 
We impute a character to God, much as we impute a character to 
the Chorus. Or, in the manner of a joke that I read the other day: 
 
Two boys were walking home from Sunday school after 
hearing a strong preaching on the devil. 
One said to the other, “What did you think about all this Satan 
stuff?” 




The other boy replied, “Well, you know how Santa Claus turned 
out. It’s probably just your Dad.” 
 
The thing, the object encountered in the theory of interpassivity 
doesn’t even allow us the luxury of Satan as Our Father; we passively 
give over the work of being a divided subject to a machine that can 
never “know” as we do, and in fact are in thrall to this object, being as it is 
the Master of a Science that operates autonomously within its own logic 
that cannot be questioned by a divided subject. To trust this object of 
science that cannot know us with our jouissance has to be called into 
question. As Lacan reminds us: 
 
If I have said that language is what the unconscious is 
structured like, that it because language, first of all, doesn’t exist. 
Language is what we try to know concerning the function of 
language. 
 
Certainly, it is thus that scientific discourse itself approached 
language, except that it is difficult for scientific discourse to fully 
actualize language, since it misrecognizes the unconscious. The 
unconscious evinces knowledge that, for the most part, escapes the 
speaking being (Lacan 1973c: 138-139).  
 
Dear God, start an evolution someone! 
 
1 With apologies to Philip K Dick. 
2 Lacan introduces the idea of “the intimate exteriority or ‘extimacy’” in regards to das 
Ding in the Seminar of February 10 1960: Courtly Love as anamorphosis (Lacan 1960a: 
139).  
3 This is the full passage that Pfaller refers to: 
‘Next then in a tragedy, there is a Chorus. And what is a Chorus? You will be told that it’s 
you yourselves. Or perhaps that it isn’t you. But that’s not the point. Means are involved 
here, emotional means. In my view, the Chorus is people who are moved. 
 ‘Therefore, look closely before telling yourself that emotions are engaged in this 
purification. They are engaged, along with others, when at the end they have to be 
pacified by some artifice or other. But that doesn’t mean to say that they are directly 
engaged. On the one hand, they no doubt are, and you are there in the form of a 
                                                        




                                                                                                                                                              
material to be made use of; on the other hand, that material is also completely 
indifferent. When you go to the theatre in the evening, you are preoccupied by the 
affairs of the day, by the pen that you lost, by the check that you will have to sign the 
next day. You shouldn’t give yourselves too much credit. You emotions are taken charge 
of by the healthy order displayed on the stage. The Chorus takes care of them. The 
emotional commentary is done for you, The greatest chance for the survival of classical 
tragedy depends on that. The emotional commentary is done for you. It is just 
sufficiently silly; it is also not without firmness; it is more or less human. 
 ‘Therefore, you don’t have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, the Chorus 
will feel in your stead. Why after all can one not imagine that the effect on you may be 
achieved, at least a small dose of it, even if you didn’t tremble that much? To be honest, 
I’m not sure if the spectator ever trembles that much. I am, however, sure that he is 
fascinated by the image of Antigone. 
 ‘In this he is the spectator, but the question we need to ask is, What is he a 
spectator of? What is the image represented by Antigone? That is the question. 
 ‘Let us not confuse this relationship to a special image with the spectacle as a 
whole. The term spectacle, which is usually used to discuss the effect of tragedy, strikes 
me as highly problematic if we don’t delimit the field to which is refers’ (Lacan 1960b: 
252). 
4 S ◊ a is first mentioned by Lacan in 1958, in the Seminar 22 of 14 May, 1958, in Seminar 
V: The Formations of the Unconscious (Lacan 1958: 17). a ◊ S first appears in the 
Seminar of 19 June 1963: From Anal to Ideal, in Seminar X: Anxiety (Lacan 1963b: 302).  
5 “Tragedy is, then, a representation of an action that is heroic and complete and of a 
certain magnitude — by means of language enriched with all kinds of ornament, each 
used separately in the different parts of the play: it represents men in action and does 
not use narrative, and through pity and fear it effects relief to these and similar 
emotions” (Aristotle 335BCE 1449b).  
6 “To set our target, I shall say that the object a — which is not to be situated in anything 
analogous to the intentionality of a noesis, which is not the intentionality of desire — is 
to be conceived of as the cause of desire. To take up my earlier metaphor, the object 
lies behind desire” (Lacan 1963a: 101). 
7 “The decisive function of my own response thus appears, and this function is not, as 
people maintain, simply to be received by the subject as approval or rejection of what 
he is saying, but truly to recognise or abolish him as subject. Such is the nature of the 
analyst’s responsibility every time he intervenes by means of speech” (Lacan 1953: 247-
248). 
8 “The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part 
of the whole, and share in the action, in the manner not of Euripides but of Sophocles. 
As for the later poets, their choral songs pertain as little to the subject of the piece as to 
that of any other tragedy. They are, therefore, sung as mere interludes-a practice first 
begun by Agathon. Yet what difference is there between introducing such choral 
interludes, and transferring a speech, or even a whole act, from one play to another” 
(Aristotle 335BCE Part XVIII). 




                                                                                                                                                              
9 Shakespeare, W. As you like it: Act II, Scene VII. 1623. 
10 What the pervert cannot bear is exactly that which the neurotic has a relationship to; 
loss. For the pervert loss of the mother’s phallus is experienced as a trauma of the 
greatest magnitude; if his almighty mother doesn’t have one, then his can be chopped 
off in the Real. The young pervert then invents one for his mother, and this is what Freud 
first describes as disavowal. He “knows” his mother doesn’t have a penis, but then again 
of course she does, how can she not! For the hysteric, of course the mother has no 
penis, neither does she, but her father does so she searches for a man who will give her 
one for herself—although nothing he ever gives her is ever good enough; she 
constantly searches for “The One”, even though she knows it might not exist. But still 
she searches! 
11 “jouir de […] to enjoy […] to enjoy the use of […] to have […] jouissance […] to have the 
use of […] pleasure […] orgasm” (Corréard, M-H, Grundy, V, Ormal-Grenon, J-B, Rubery, J, 
[eds.]  Le Dictionnaire Hachette-Oxford Concise: français  anglais anglais  français. 
329. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009.) 
12 Clavreul asks “who is the partner of a pervert?” in his article “The Perverse Couple” 
(1967). In it he does question the status of the pervert’s partner, especially in relationship 
to the fetish object. 
13 “The LORD saw that the wickedness of humankind was great in the earth, and that 
every inclination of the thoughts of their hearts was only evil continually. And the LORD 
was sorry that he had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart. So 
the LORD said, ‘I will blot out from the earth the human beings I have created — people 
together with animals and creeping things and birds of the air, for I am sorry that I have 
made them.’ But Noah found favour in the sight of the LORD” (Genesis 6:5-8). This is a 
myth that stands well in the face of Freud’s writings, particularly Totem and Taboo 
(1913) which describes how the taboo against incest was put in to place; precisely 
because an organization against incest was needed to create a Law that castrated 
continuous polymorphous pleasure. The Christian myth describes this well, if a little on 
the side of complete holocaust. This God, it seems, was a murderous castrating judge. 
14 “We would thus find anew here the Sovereign Good of the Greeks by induction from 
this effect, if Kant, as is his wont, did not specify once more that this Good does not act 
as a counterweight but rather, so to speak, as an anti-weight — that is, subtracting 
weight from the pride [amour-propre] (Selbstsucht) the subject experiences as 
contentment (arrogantia) in his pleasures, insofar as a look at this Good renders these 
pleasures less respectable. This is precisely what the text says and quite suggestive. 
 “Let us consider the paradox that it is at the very moment at which the subject 
no longer has any object before him that he encounters a law that has no other 
phenomenon than something that is already signifying; the latter is obtained from a 
voice in conscience, which, in articulating in the form of a maxim in conscience, 
proposes the order of a purely practical reason or will there. 
 “For this maxim to constitute a law, it is necessary and sufficient that, being put 
to the test of such reason, the maxim may be considered universal as far as logic is 
concerned. This does not mean — let us recall what ‘logic’ entails — that it forces itself 




                                                                                                                                                              
on everyone, but rather that it is valid in every case or, better stated, that it is not valid in 
any case if it is not valid in every case […] The crux of the diatribe is, let us say, found in 
the maxim that proposes a rule for jouissance, which is odd in that it defers to Kant’s 
mode in being laid down as a universal rule. Let us enunciate the maxim: 
 “ ‘I have the right to enjoy your body,’ anyone can say to me, ‘and I will exercise 
this right without any limit to the capriciousness of the exactions I may wish to satiate 
with your body.’” (Lacan 1963c: 647-648).  
15 “I-thing” is a term that I am borrowing from my colleague Julie-Anne Smith, who has 
worked on the question of emerging technologies, social bonds and the object, and 
whose knowledge held a great value to the Lacanian Cartel on Psychoanalysis and 
Culture in Everyday Life in the 21st Century (Melbourne). 
16 See for instance Freud’s case of the Rat Man: Freud, S. “Notes Upon a Case of 
Obsessional Neurosis”. In Freud, S. 2001. The Standard Edition on the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume X (1909): Two Case Histories: ‘Little 
Hans’ and the ‘Rat Man’. 153-327. London: Vintage. 1909. 
17 Given that priests have been so unfrocked in recent times to actually bring to light the 
horrors of their polymorphous perversity that cannot be successfully castrated by the 
Rules of God of Abstinence, maybe the believing metal prayer wheel is a better option, if 
you want to believe. (Apologies to Agent Fox Mulder.) 
18 Freud described this phenomenon of the pleasure of absence in his account of the 
butcher’s witty wife, who took her pleasure from the absence of pleasure, the desire for 
the lack of desire: see Freud, S. “Chapter IV: Distortion in Dreams”. In Freud, S. 2001. The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume IV 
(1900): The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part). Translated by J Strachey. 135-162. 
London: Vintage Press. 1900. See specifically pages 146-151. 
19 “Now if you consider the vase from the point of view I first proposed, as an object 
made to represent the existence of the emptiness at the centre of the real that is called 
the Thing, this emptiness as represented in the representation presents itself as a nihil, 
as nothing. And that is why the potter, just like you to whom I am speaking, creates the 
vase with his hand around this emptiness, creates it, just like the mythical creator, ex 
nihilo, starting with a hole” (Lacan 1960: 121).  
20 Freud, S. “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of 
Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)”. In Freud, S. 2001. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XII (1911-1913): Case History 
of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works. 3-84. London: Vintage. 1911. SEE 
ALSO Schreber, D. Memoirs of my Nervous Illness. Translated by I MacAlpine. New 
York: The New York Review of Books. 2000. 
21 My father told me the following tale: when he was a boy in Communist 
Czechoslovakia, it was illegal to own US currency. Some benevolent — but otherwise 
ignorant — western charity tried to establish a penpal system for youth in 
“underprivileged countries” and my father was in correspondence with another young 
person from the USA. As it happened, the penpal once sent my father a letter containing 
a US dollar, which my father had to destroy in case the authorities would arrest him. It 




                                                                                                                                                              
surprises me that the letter was not first opened and read by the state censor at the 
time, which would have surely finished with my father’s arrest, for it would have been 
his crime against the Socialist State in receiving the currency, not the crime of the well-
intentioned young capitalist in the USA. 
22 For instance: a fuckboi may use the i-phone to send his dick pix to cause jouissance to 
a random woman on Tindr. An obsessional neurotic may use his i-phone to watch a 
football game whilst he himself is sitting at the football with the game playing on the 
field in front of him. A hysteric posts selfie after selfie to get followers to adore her, and 
Donald Trump tweets at 3am in the morning for whatever deluded purpose he thinks is 
a good idea. 
23 I deliberately do not include the hysteric in this structural schema of the interpassive 
subject: the hysteric deals with the lost object of desire, the objet a. For instance, my 
husband’s obsession with his i-phone: when asked what the weather looks like, he 
reaches for the app instead of sticking his head out of the window. The weather app is 
continuously proved incorrect. I would like to take his i-phone and flush it down the 
toilet, so as to lose this object forever and stimulate his desire to stick his head out of the 
window and engage with the weather, to enact some mythic time of my own which is 
lost to ages past and which represents a fantasy of utopia for me (ie, the good old days 
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